The US Supreme Court has once again confirmed that at least as far as constitutional law is concerned, sex is more dangerous than violence. Sounds sort of strange, doesn’t it? That’s what results when the constitution is construed by so-called “conservatives” who think their personal view of what is acceptable is more important that deciding cases based upon the words contained in our constitution. At the end of June, the Court decided Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, a case challenging a California law restricting access to violent video games.
California passed a law punishing the sale or rental of “violent video games” to minors, and requiring their packaging to be labeled “18.” The punishment for violating the statute was a fine of $1,000. The law defined a violent video game as that which “[a] reasonable person, considering the game as a whole, would find appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors,” that is “patently offensive to prevailing standards in the community as to what is suitable for minors,” and that “causes the game, as a whole, to lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.” That definition is virtually identical to the standard which the Supreme Court has upheld as being acceptable to criminalize speech involving depiction of sexual conduct. The only difference is that it is applied to minors, rather than the general public.
The decision of the Court was written by Justice Scalia, one of the most conservative members of the Court. He started his analysis of the statute with the unremarkable finding that video games are protected by the First Amendment, since they are a form of expression.
Standing by itself, Scalia’s opinion is one of the most eloquent explications of the reach and meaning of the First Amendment. The opinion starts out with the observation: “The Free Speech Clause exists principally to protect discourse on public matters, but we have long recognized that it is difficult to distinguish politics from entertainment, and dangerous to try.” Having no trouble at all in applying the First Amendment to video games, Scalia wrote:
Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection. Under our Constitution, “esthetic and moral judgments about art and literature . . . are for the individual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority. , , , . And whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, “the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not vary” when a new and different medium for communication appears. . . .The most basic of those principles is this: “[A]s a general matter, . . . government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”
Pretty good stuff, isn’t it? This is a great statement affirming that our freedom to speak on virtually any subject is broad and all-encompassing. It applies to every area of human endeavor, including entertainment.
But, in the very next sentence, Scalia shows his blind spot. He lists the few and narrow exceptions to the protection of free speech: 1) obscenity; 2) incitement and fighting words. Let’s stop there. Think about this, and ask yourself if it makes any sense. Anyone has the constitutional right to say anything on any subject except these three categories.
“Incitement” means trying to get a mob to riot and cause immediate injury and property damage. The most famous description of this exception was uttered by Justice Holmes nearly one hundred years ago: No one has the right to yell “fire” in a crowded movie theater. That statement makes it clear why such talk can and must be prohibited. I doubt that anyone would claim to have that right.
Fighting words are those words which are considered to be statements that would make virtually anyone immediately react by punching the speaker in the nose, almost knee-jerk reaction. They have been legally defined as “words which, by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Again, very few people would argue that anyone has the right to wander the streets picking fights with people by walking up to others and daring them to start a fight. The rationale for this exception was long ago expressed by the Supreme Court thusly: Such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Now, we come to the third expression: obscenity. The definition of obscenity is virtually identical to the definition of violent video games which the Supreme Court has now found to be unconstitutional. The only difference is that obscenity applies to discussions and depictions of sex, while the violence applies to fighting, maiming and personal injury to others.
This decision of the Court carries out the ridiculous dichotomy in our jurisprudence between sex and violence. It is legal to engage in consensual sex. People can engage in virtually any kind of sexual conduct as long as all participants wish to do so. But, you can go to jail for talking about or describing certain kinds of sexual conduct. In other words, you can do it, but you can’t tell anyone about it.
On the other hand, most kinds of violent conduct are subject to criminal prosecution because they cause bodily injury and death to other people, who most certainly do not consent to being the victim of such acts. But, you can write about such conduct, show it in movies, and other media of expression with no restriction. If we were to outlaw the depiction of violent conduct, television and movie theaters would have a hard time finding anything to display.
This distinction is absurd. It has no legitimate basis. It is the relic of the imposition of the views of certain religious beliefs on our legal system. The very concept violates the other main precept of the First Amendment: separation of church and state. Yet, some people, epitomized by Judge Scalia, simply cannot separate their private religious beliefs from political and legal discourse. This inability to separate the religious from the secular is at the basis of the current opposition of many to gay marriage. They continually assert that marriage is applicable only to a man and a woman. It simply cannot apply to two people of the same sex. They simply cannot understand that the concept of marriage, which they claim must be upheld by our political institutions is a religious concept, which the First Amendment clearly states cannot be imposed on anyone who does not wish to subscribe to that belief. The problem is that the religious concept of marriage was imported wholesale into our political process.
The importation of that concept into law was wrong. It should be reversed immediately. The concept of civil unions, which is gaining more traction daily, and which is being enacted into law in more and more states should be the only governmental form of regulation of the relationship between two people. Everyone has the right to believe in marriage and what they believe that means, and to engage in those beliefs without interference. By the same token, no one has the right to impose those beliefs on anyone else. No one includes the government, federal, state or local. The government must simply get out of the business of telling people to whom they may commit their love and their life.
The same thing holds for entertainment. As Judge Scalia so eloquently explicates in his opinion in this case, no government should have the right to outlaw certain kinds of speech based upon the content of that speech. The Supreme Court has recently held new categories of unprotected speech may not be added to the list by a legislature that concludes certain speech is too harmful to be tolerated. That assertion is clearly right. However, just as clearly, it does not go far enough. Old categories of speech which have been wrongfully singled out as not worthy of protection by the First Amendment must be reconsidered as well. Ironically, Scalia recognizes the dichotomy which makes the suppression of so-called obscenity ridiculous when he acknowledges that just last term, the Supreme Court held that while it was permissible for governments to prevent cruelty to animals, it was not permissible to forbid people from depicting such cruelty to animals. This shows the same blind spot. Scalia indeed recognizes that there is no principled difference between allowing the depiction of violence or cruelty to animals, and forbidding the depiction of sexual activities. He feels a need to justify this dichotomy. The only test he can find is one which simply is not rational. His explanation (some might say excuse) for allowing sexual matters to be the only speech which may be suppressed based on its content by asserting that we have a history of suppressing speech. In his own words, suppression of such speech is “traditional.”
Obviously, that is not a valid reason which will stand up to any kind of scrutiny. Slavery was “traditional” in this country for centuries. Where did that get us?
Not every member of the Court agreed with Justice Scalia’s decision. Justices Roberts and Alito agreed that the statute was unconstitutional, but only because of the manner in which it was written. They seemed to be of the view that the statute was invalid because the definition of “violent video games” was not sufficiently precise. They would, however, allow the passage of a statute outlawing certain speech if it was defined in a sufficiently narrow fashion. They obviously do not understand that the First Amendment forbids the suppression of speech based upon the subject of it content. They objected to the fact that the statute did not sufficiently define the terms “deviant” and “morbid.” Of course, they failed to recognize that those very terms have been accepted as permissible for regulating speech based on sexual conduct.
Scalia understood this shortcoming by the two justices who disagreed with him. He attempts to rebut their approach by stating: “Whether government regulation applies to creating, distributing, or consuming speech makes no difference.” He is absolutely right in that observation. It is absurd to state that the government can prohibit the sale or distribution of a work, but not the making of it. He simply refuses to apply that same approach to the regulation of speech involving sexual conduct. Indeed, the Court has approved the approach which Scalia condemns here to sexual matters. The Court has held that the mere possession of obscenity by an individual for his or her own personal use cannot be punished by the government, but the distribution and sale of that material may be made a criminal offense.
This kind of myopic objection to sexual matters is not rationally supportable. Allowing this kind of irrational conduct by governments undermines the authority of all governmental activities. It promotes disobedience of other legitimate governmental restrictions. Every time the government criminalizes conduct which a large number of citizens believe is acceptable, it undermines its own legitimacy. Such conduct does not promote respect for the government. It gives far too many people an excuse to attempt to evade laws which are legitimate and ought to be obeyed.
It is time for all of us to examine the views of our so-called “political leaders” closely. We must stop giving authority to those whose agenda is to impose their narrow views on the rest of us. I could go on almost indefinitely in this vein, but you get the idea.
It is time to wake up and begin taking action against stupid and harmful government conduct. Our economy is in trouble because we put the wrong people in charge of safeguarding our society. It is time to speak up and get rid of those so-called representatives whose actions are controlled by the special interest groups who give them the most money. Those folks are not helping the majority of Americans. Let’s see if we can find some legislators who recognize that granting huge tax breaks to banks and huge multi-national corporations or allowing their actions to be dictated by some religious fanatic is not in the best interest of this country.
Wayne B. Giampietro
Poltrock & Giampietro
123 W. Madison St., Suite 1300
Chicago, IL 60602